were of help to me in the execution (DfirchfUhrung) of this paper'. Godel tells me2 that 'in the execution' should be replaced by 'regarding the formulation for the publication'.
?2. The incompleteness theorems. In the summer of 1930, Gddel began to study the problem of proving the consistency of analysis. He found it mysterious that Hilbert wanted to prove directly the consistency of analysis by finitist method. He believes generally that one should divide the difficulties so that each part can be overcome more easily. In this particular case, his idea was to prove the consistency of number theory by finitist number theory, and prove the consistency of analysis by number theory, where one can assume the truth of number theory, not only the consistency. The problem he set for himself at that time was the relative consistency of analysis to number theory; this problem is independent of the somewhat indefinite concept of finitist number theory.
He represented real numbers by formulas (or sentences)3 of number theory and found he had to use the concept of truth for sentences in number theory in order to verify the comprehension axiom for analysis. He quickly ran into the paradoxes (in particular, the Liar and Richard's) connected with truth and definability. He realized that truth in number theory cannot be defined in number theory and therefore his plan of proving the relative consistency of analysis did not work. He went on to draw the conclusion that in suitably strong systems such as that of Principia mathematics ( At this time, Godel represented symbols by natural numbers, sentences by sequences of numbers, and proofs by sequences of sequences of numbers. All these notions and also the substitution function are easily expressible even in small finitary subsystems of type theory or set theory. Hence there are undecidable propositions in every system containing such a system. The undecidable propositions are finitary combinatorial in nature.
In September 1930, G6del attended a meeting at K6nigsberg (reported in the second volume of Erkenntnis) and announced his result. R. Carnap, A. Heyting, and J. von Neumann were at the meeting.4 Von Neumann was very enthusiastic about the result and had a private discussion with G&del. In this discussion, von Neumann asked whether number-theoretical undecidable propositions could also be constructed in view of the fact that the combinatorial objects can be mapped onto the integers and expressed the belief that it could be done. In reply, G6del said, "Of 2Gddel had completed his dissertation before showing it to Hahn. This was longer than the published paper and accepted for the degree in its original form. It was in preparing the shorter version for publication that Godel made use of Hahn's suggestions.
30r 'propositional functions' according to a prominent tradition at that time. 4At the same meeting F. Waismann also gave a lecture entitled course undecidable propositions about integers could be so constructed, but they would contain concepts quite different from those occurring in number theory like addition and multiplication". Shortly afterward G6del, to his own astonishment, succeeded in turning the undecidable proposition into a polynomial form preceded by quantifiers (over natural numbers). At the same time but independently of this result, Godel also discovered his second theorem to the effect that no consistency proof of a reasonably rich system can be formalized in the system itself.
An abstract stating these results was presented on October 23, 1930 to the Vienna Academy of Sciences by Hans Hahn. Shortly afterwards G6del received a letter from von Neumann suggesting the theorem on consistency proofs as a consequence of Godel's original result. The full celebrated paper was received for publication by the Monatshefte on November 17, 1930 and published early in 1931. In a note dated January 22, 1931 (K. Menger, Kolloquium, vol. 3, pp. 12-13), G6del gave a more general presentation of his theorems using Peano arithmetic rather than type theory as the basic system. The major paper was also Gddel's Habilitationsschrift. serious work. He had rheumatic fever when he was eight or nine years old and this has had a bad effect on his heart. He has had serious trouble with his digestion during almost all his adult years. Since 1947 he has had an infection of the kidneys which makes him very sensitive to colds and he does not recover from colds without using antibiotics. In particular, his health was exceptionally poor in 1936, in 1961 and in 1970.
?4. Constructible sets. It must have been in 1930 when Godel first heard about Hilbert's proposed outline of a proof of the continuum hypothesis in axiomatic set theory (say ZF). This was the time when G6del began to think about the continuum problem. He felt that one should not build up the hierarchy in a constructive way and it is not necessary to do so for a proof of consistency o f CH, and, therefore, one does not have to construct the ordinals except for a prejudice against the objectivist point of view. The ramified hierarchy came to G6del's mind. G6del observes that Hilbert did not believe CH to be decidable in ZF, since Hilbert adds a tacit axiom stating that every set can be defined and speaks of his proposed proof as a great triumph of his proof theory. Moreover, according to Hilbert's claim, he did much more than proving CH, he also proved the consistency of ZF on the way. To prove so much, one must expect a very difficult proof.
It hypothesis also will hold. He told these things to von Neumann during his stay at Princeton in the autumn of 1935. The discovery of the proof of this conjecture on the basis of his definition is not too difficult. Godel gave the proof (also for the GCH) not until three years later because he had fallen ill in the meantime. This proof was using a submodel of the constructible sets in the lowest case countable, similar to the one commonly given today. 80n June 9, 1976, Godel recalled that in 1941 or 1942 he wrote his paper on Russell's mathematical logic. He described the paper as a history of logic with special reference to the work of Russell.
Judging from Russell's reply to his critics (dated July 1943), it seems likely that Godel wrote the paper mainly in 1942 to 1943. The note says in part: 'Dr. Godel's most interesting paper on my mathematical logic came into my hands after my replies had been completed, and at a time when I had no leisure to work on it.... His great ability, as shown by his previous work, makes me think it highly probable that many of his criticisms of me are justified'.
Godel's paper concludes with some optimistic claims by Leibniz on the future possibilities of mathematical logic. Godel told me that during the war he was interested in Leibniz but could not get hold of the manuscripts of Leibniz. When these manuscripts finally came in after the war, his interest had shifted to other directions.
'Apparently Godel continued to work on trying to apply his method to the continuum hypothesis for quite some time. It seems likely that his philosophical paper on the continuum problem 
